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ABSTRACT 
 
Electronic commerce users continually access sensitive information on business databases 
through the Internet.  In order to protect databases from unauthorized access, confidentiality 
policies must be applied. Confidentiality of the database is often protected by data encryption or 
proprietary software. It can be protected by a monitoring system using Markov Chain and Bell- 
LaPadula Models.  In this paper, a two category secured access database model by semi-Markov 
chains is discussed. This paper simulates this simplified two category secured access database 
model, and issues on security management are also addressed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a typical e-commerce database, data is accessed by the public, twenty four hours per day, and 
seven days per week (Smith, 2006; Halle & Kikinis, 2004).  While the Internet is especially 
vulnerable to exposing confidential information from e-commerce databases through wire or 
wireless communications, most of the literature discusses how to protect the data integrity of 
databases. Confidentiality is often ensured using data encryption, but using encryption often 
degrades database access speed.  Additionally, databases are too frequently used to be securely 
managed, and data privacy is actually never fully monitored (Becker, Amab, & Serra, 2008).  
Hence, this presents a major problem for databases in ensuring both confidentiality and 
performance. 
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The Bell-LaPadula Model is a confidentiality model for system security and has been used by the 
United States military for years (Bell & LaPadula, 1973, 1975).  Chen, Lee, and Yang (2006) and 
Chen, Shing, lee, and Shing (2007) use the Bell-LaPadual model to classify suppliers and 
purchasing companies into different security groups in a supply chain network.  Shing, Shing, 
Chen, and Lee (2006) further suggested modeling the security state transitions by using Markov 
Chain model in which states were created by use of all the combinations of (Security Clearance, 
Classification) pairs in the Bell-LaPadula model.  Later Shing, Shing, Chen, and Lee (2008, 2009) 
has extended the model and provided a simulation experiment to prove the effectiveness of their 
model.  This study is to continue Shing and Chen’s previous work by providing more 
explanations of the Markov chain model and to use another simulation set to prove the model’s 
effectiveness.  
 
The next section discusses what categories (Security Clearance, Classification) are in the Bell-
LaPadula model.  Then, it attempts to model a secured database network using a privileged group 
who may take four different actions in a sequence and a public group who has only two different 
“read” privileges.  Finally, the results from the simulations, as well as several properties, are 
examined and analyzed. 
 
Secured Database Access in a Web Environment 
 
In a web environment, a user has to use a simple authentication method (i.e. user id and password) 
to enter his account or the network.  When the user enters sensitive data into a database through a 
web form, the database normally will use another authentication technique to make sure that the 
user has the right to access the database (See Figure 1).  On December 2006, the retail giant TJX 
company detected a “suspicious software” on its computer system and later it was confirmed an 
intrusion and data loss.  In this case, database break-in was the result of inappropriate data access 
control and cost the TJX more than 40 millions (Panko, 2009). 
 
There are many methods used to control the confidentiality of data.  One of them is the Bell-
LaPadula Model which has been used in the military (Bishop, 2003). Assuming in a simplified 
secured database network, there are only two groups involved: the privileged group and the 
public group. These privileged groups are called security clearances.  In the model, the privileged 
group can act on two objects. The actions are either to access system files or to use special 
software tools.  For the public group security clearance, users are to read announcements or 
advertisements on Web pages.  However, users in the public group are not allowed to access 
system files nor to use special software tools.   Furthermore, the privileged group members are 
allowed access to all of the permissions that the public group enjoys.  In the next section, we will 
discuss another method, the semi-Markov chain model, to control the security. 
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Figure 1: Database Access in a Web Environment.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-Markov Chain Model for Secured Database Access in a Web Environment 
 
Like nature disasters, security threats cannot be completely stopped. However, we can use a 
probability model (such as Markov chain) to predict the possible security condition of the 
database systems.  A Markov chain is a stochastic process in which the probability of a system 
state depends only on the previous state (Molloy, 1988).  In the following, we use a simple 
security access model to explain how to use the Markov chain to monitor the security (Bhat, 
1972).  This example is revised from the Wikipedia (2009).  The probabilities of security 
conditions, given the security on the preceding period, can be represented by a transition matrix: 
 






=
5.05.0
2.08.0
P  
 
The matrix P represents the security model in which a secure period is 80% likely to be followed 
by another secure period, and a non-secure period is 50% likely to be followed by another secure 
period. The columns can be labeled “secure" and “non-secure" respectively, and the rows can be 
labeled in the same order.  (P)i j , the ith row and jth column of the probability matrix P, is the 
probability that, if a given period is of type i, it will be followed by a period of type j (Wikipedia, 
2009). 
 
The security on period 0, the initial state, is known to be secure. This is represented by a vector in 
which the “secure" entry is 100%, and the “non-secure" entry is 0%: 
  
[ ]01)0( =X  
 
The security on period 1 can be predicted by: 
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Thus, there is an 80% chance that period 1 will also be secure. The secure on period 2 can be 
predicted in the same way: 
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General rules for period n are (Wikipedia, 2009): 
  
PXX nn )1()( −=  
 
  
nn PXX )0()( =  
 
 
and pij is the probability of the system in the state j, given it was in the state i.  Furthermore, a 
semi-Markov chain can be defined as a stochastic process that can have an arbitrary distribution 
between state changes (Molloy, 1988).  A variety of different distributions will be used in the 
simulation in the following section. 
 
In order to apply semi-Markov chains to the simplified secured database network, all states in the 
proposed model consist of all the possible combinations of (Security Clearance, Classification) 
pairs in the Bell-LaPadula model.  A detailed calculation of the state transitions can be referred in 
the paper by Shing et al. (2006). In the next section, we will discuss the simulation experiment 
and results. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this research, we will use a simulation experiment to explain how to use semi-Markov chain 
model to monitor the security of the database access in a web environment.  The simulation 
program starts by randomly generating initial states of privileged group’s four possible actions 
and public group’s two possible actions. And then we simulate the state transitions based on a 
randomly generating distribution for each row of the transition probability matrix. In the next 
section we compare the steady states after simulation runs starting from the same initial states 
and time=one million. 
 
Table 1 presents a sample run of the semi-Markov chain when both privileged group and other 
public group’s transition probability matrices are independent standard normal distributions. It 
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also reaches a steady state after time=one million: 
 
Table 1: A Semi-Markov Chain Simulation Run for 2 category confidential model. 
state 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Time=0 state 0.00802 0.15932 0.11954 0.11931 0.01174 0.23284 0.17475 0.17439 
State Transition 
probability 
matrix T 
0.18303 0.36771 0.42340 0.02186 0.23161 0.46547 0.53592 0.02761 
0.26438 0.08511 0.17835 0.41728 0.33452 0.10773 0.22571 0.52810 
0.02827 0.12613 0.00100 0.00718 0.03578 0.15965 0.00136 0.00910 
0.13115 0.02778 0.00399 0.16051 0.16594 0.03511 0.00497 0.20315 
0.11850 0.23829 0.27435 0.01416 0.06992 0.14053 0.16193 0.00830 
0.17122 0.05510 0.11555 0.27030 0.10108 0.03258 0.06819 0.15958 
0.01832 0.08172 0.00064 0.00464 0.01081 0.04820 0.00037 0.00272 
0.08492 0.01796 0.00253 0.10407 0.05012 0.01062 0.00144 0.06134 
Time=1000000 
state 
0.27036 0.234007 0.062476 0.094555 0.138411 0.119802 0.031985 0.048408 
 
In order to generate the transition probability for a semi-Markov chain, the transition 
probabilities should be drawn from a truncated probability distribution. For example, there are 
four states in the privileged group, the transition probability for the last state is generated by 
subtracting the sum of transition probabilities of the first three states from one. The initial state is 
set to be X(0)=(X1(0), X2(0), …, X8(0))=(0.008032, 0.159372, 0.119594, 0.119371, 0.011734, 
0.232814, 0.174705, 0.174379) and ∑
=
8
1i
Xi(0)  =1. Each simulation runs for one million time 
units. The simulation runs are randomly repeated for ten times. The mean μ0 of final states of all 
10 runs are created and the variance-covariance matrix Σ is created for each case. Those eight 
states are correlated which can be shown by drawing scatter plots as in the Figure 2 where the 
horizontal axis represents the number of runs. 
 
 
Assume that Σ is known, we can test the hypothesis H0: μ= μ0 vs H1: μ≠ μ0. We reject H0  at the 
α  level if n( y  - μ0)´ Σ ⁻¹ ( y  - μ0) > χ²α,p, where y = ∑
=
10
1i
iy /10 is the average of n (n=10) final 
states of all runs and p (p=8)is the total number of states [15]. That is, to reject H0 at 0.05 level if 
10( y  - μ0)´ Σ⁻¹ ( y  - μ0) > χ²0.05,8 =15.51 (Note: Σ can be known from analyzing data from a long 
history or have a substantial evidence to support it).  
 
Figure 2: Scatter plots of eight states when both privileged group and public group are 
randomly generated uniform (0,1).  
 
    
 
Simulation of a Two-Category Secured Access Database  Shing, Shing, Chen, & Lee 
 
Communications of the IIMA 6 2009  Volume 9, Issue 3 
    
 
    
 
    
 
    
Simulation of a Two-Category Secured Access Database  Shing, Shing, Chen, & Lee 
 
Communications of the IIMA 7 2009  Volume 9, Issue 3 
     
 
    
 
However, if Σ is unknown, the sample variance-covariance matrix S is used to estimate Σ . Then 
we can test the hypothesis H0: μ= μ0 vs H1: μ≠ μ 0. We reject H0 if 10( y  - μ0)´ S⁻¹ ( y  - μ0) > 
T²α,8,9, where y = ∑
=
10
1i
iy /10 is the average of 10 final states of all runs and T² is the Hotelling’s T² 
test. And  S is the sample variance-covariance matrix, which can be obtained by 
( )( )∑
=
−−−
n
i
ii nyyyy
1
)1('  (Rencher, 1995). S⁻¹ is the inverse matrix of S. Table 2 shows mean 
μ0 and the sample variance-covariance matrix S of 10 runs of a randomly generated exponential 
distributions with λ  =0.5 for both privileged group and public group transition matrices.
 
Table 2:  Mean μ0 and the sample variance-covariance matrix S of 10 runs. 
 
 state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4 state 5 state 6 state 7 state 8 
run 1 0.035758 0.033229 0.028166 0.063432 0.186915 0.173696 0.147228 0.331576 
run 2 0.075491 0.083102 0.063786 0.102328 0.156999 0.172827 0.132656 0.212811 
run 3 0.070722 0.074572 0.046805 0.136803 0.144302 0.152158 0.095503 0.279136 
run 4 0.167957 0.121822 0.085619 0.236955 0.106324 0.077119 0.054201 0.150003 
run 5 0.004344 0.014963 0.013163 0.025601 0.070465 0.242701 0.213505 0.415257 
run 6 0.135167 0.128909 0.024098 0.395106 0.062654 0.059753 0.01117 0.183143 
run 7 0.029725 0.025859 0.022198 0.044041 0.214277 0.186412 0.160016 0.317473 
run 8 0.103477 0.184298 0.177478 0.079137 0.086602 0.154242 0.148535 0.066231 
Simulation of a Two-Category Secured Access Database  Shing, Shing, Chen, & Lee 
 
Communications of the IIMA 8 2009  Volume 9, Issue 3 
run 9 0.04108 0.027073 0.136061 0.265332 0.046409 0.030585 0.15371 0.29975 
run 10 0.034968 0.012358 0.082895 0.228278 0.062572 0.022113 0.148333 0.408484 
Average 0.0698689 0.0706185 0.0680269 0.1577013 0.1137519 0.1271606 0.1264857 0.2663864 
         
         
C
ovariance 
0.0054617 0.0052972 0.002789 0.0062042 0 0 0 0 
0.0052972 0.0061768 0.0040692 0.0043542 0 0 0 0 
0.002789 0.0040692 0.0056912 0.0030693 0 0 0.0015227 0 
0.0062042 0.0043542 0.0030693 0.0125776 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0.0061557 0.0052186 0.0020248 0.0017799 
0 0 0 0 0.0052186 0.0078473 0.0049162 0.0033331 
0 0 0.0015227 0 0.0020248 0.0049162 0.0061214 0.0063737 
0 0 0 0 0.0017799 0.0033331 0.0063737 0.011858 
 
To test the hypothesis H0: μ= μ0 vs H1: μ≠ μ0, where μ0 =  
0.0698689 0.070618 0.068026 0.157701 0.113751 0.127160 0.126485 0.266386 
 
The average of ten observations is y  =  
0.0558786 0.0584626 0.0638141 0.1348081 0.130934 0.118523 0.1117931 0.3257857 
 
Table 2: Average μ0 and the sample (variance-) covariance matrix S of 10 runs of a randomly 
generated exponential distribution with λ  =0.5 
 
From Table 2, 10( y  - μ0)´ S⁻¹ ( y  - μ0) =67326 > T²0.05,8,9 = 697.356. The null hypothesis is 
rejected at 0.05 level. Therefore the security may have been breached. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are six different truncated distributions generated for privileged and public transition 
probability matrices. They are Erlang of order k (k=2, 3, 4, 5), exponential with parameter λ 
(λ=0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5), gamma with parameter θ=1 and β (β=1, 2, 3, 4, 5), standard normal, 
uniform (0,1) and Weibull distributions with ν=0, α=0.5, and β (β=1, 2, 3, 4, 5). To generate the 
transition probability matrix for each distribution, seven random variates were generated first. 
Then, they are sorted, and the probabilities up to the random variates were calculated according 
to trapezoidal rule. The probability for the last state was found by subtracting the sum of those 
probabilities from one. The algorithms for generating random variates for those distributions are 
given in (Banks, Carson, & Nelson, 1996).  Because every entry of both privileged and public 
transition matrices is non-zero, they all reach equilibrium states. Table 3 shows the average of 
final states after 10 runs for those randomly generated distributions. 
 
 
 
 
Simulation of a Two-Category Secured Access Database  Shing, Shing, Chen, & Lee 
 
Communications of the IIMA 9 2009  Volume 9, Issue 3 
Table 3:  Average of final state after 10 runs. 
Average of 10 Runs 
 state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4 state 5 state 6 state 7 state 8 
Uniform 0.19422 0.12855 0.03426 0.04751 0.29617 0.17146 0.06513 0.06258 
exp0.5 0.07497 0.07591 0.07414 0.19103 0.10965 0.11217 0.10686 0.25518 
exp1.0 0.13429 0.09438 0.06419 0.17969 0.15971 0.09497 0.06636 0.20652 
exp1.5 0.06333 0.05342 0.06896 0.13135 0.12374 0.11822 0.14313 0.29786 
exp2.0 0.06396 0.05304 0.05194 0.11742 0.1508 0.13737 0.13803 0.28746 
exp2.5 0.05682 0.04623 0.08881 0.12678 0.12676 0.11605 0.17069 0.26776 
normal 0.11678 0.11409 0.09745 0.12391 0.14061 0.12564 0.12248 0.15896 
erlang2 0.26023 0.14558 0.02886 0.01957 0.31886 0.17209 0.03508 0.01979 
erlang3 0.28381 0.19213 0.04952 0.03424 0.21496 0.17364 0.03996 0.01179 
erlang4 0.18822 0.16456 0.02851 0.00741 0.29623 0.24997 0.05605 0.00909 
erlang5 0.23856 0.17182 0.03057 0.00643 0.28817 0.22721 0.03008 0.00718 
gammab1 0.05515 0.04942 0.06129 0.11553 0.13612 0.11308 0.17743 0.29209 
gammab2 0.29418 0.01257 0.05268 0.20122 0.23032 0.00947 0.03895 0.16066 
gammab3 0.45924 0.00526 0.02247 0.18966 0.21954 0.00255 0.01089 0.09038 
gammab4 0.56793 0.01547 0.02639 0.14695 0.18249 0.00479 0.00865 0.04735 
gammab5 0.63954 0.00015 0.00059 0.15948 0.16018 2.65E-5 0.00015 0.03996 
weibull1 0.05932 0.05962 0.04338 0.10617 0.16184 0.14339 0.13527 0.29094 
weibull2 0.05702 0.06108 0.04454 0.13189 0.18618 0.11057 0.14359 0.26524 
weibull3 0.09064 0.10824 0.07744 0.17582 0.08737 0.14493 0.09026 0.22521 
weibull4 0.07561 0.05918 0.07356 0.18066 0.12173 0.07298 0.12198 0.29421 
weibull5 0.05169 0.04821 0.06791 0.10444 0.13267 0.16289 0.15999 0.27215 
 
To visualize the comparison of the averaged steady states in Table 2, Figure 3 shows only state 3 in 
the steady states is about the same for all different distributions. The rest states can be a lot different. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of steady states for different distributions. 
 
 
By constantly checking the state transition matrix, we can find out whether the system will reach 
a steady state. Any state that does not belong to one of the possible eight states violates the 
security requirement. Besides, if any state probability p(s) at time s from the simulation run 
shows any abnormality compared to data collected, then it may have a security breach. For 
example, if a public group accesses system files, then the system will warn the security privileged 
group about security leak and suggest the group to take actions. Overall, the proposed model can 
help managers to understand the confidential status of each public group and then implement 
necessary security strategies. 
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